Abstract-This paper proposes a coordinated defense scheme of distributed denial of service (DDoS) network attacks, based on the backward-propagation, on-off control strategy. When a DDoS attack is in effect, a high concentration of malicious packet streams are routed to the victim in a short time, making it a hot spot. A similar problem has been observed in multiprocessor systems, where a hot spot is formed when a large number of processors access simultaneously shared variables in the same memory module. Despite the similar terminologies used here, solutions for multiprocessor hot spot problems cannot be applied to that in the Internet, because the hot traffic in DDoS may only represent a small fraction of the Internet traffic, and the attack strategies on the Internet are far more sophisticated than that in the multiprocessor systems. The performance impact on the hot spot is related to the total hot packet rate that can be tolerated by the victim. We present a backward pressure propagation, feedback control scheme to defend DDoS attacks. We use a generic network model to analyze the dynamics of network traffic, and develop the algorithms for rate-based and queue-length-based feedback control. We show a simple design to implement our control scheme on a practical switch queue architecture.
tacking programs into unprotected hosts, at relatively low risk of being noticed. After the hacker accumulates enough compromised hosts, he just needs to issue the attacking command to a coordinating machine, which then wakes up the dormant attacking programs to hit the victim(s) from everywhere. The attacker can set the actual attack time so far away from release of attack commands that it becomes virtually impossible to trace the real attackers. It is trivial to hit victims at scheduled strengths and durations.
Several DDoS attack schemes [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have been widely published on the Internet, with many others being developed. The first is UDP flooding, in which the victim(s) is flooded with UDP packets. TCP SYN flooding exploits the three-way handshaking procedure in the TCP protocol. The attacker merely sends large amounts of SYN packets, with spoofed source addresses, to the victim requesting for connections. The victim may quickly exhaust its resources if the large number of bogus connection requests are not resolved in time. A brute force form of attack is simply sending a large number of ACK/data packets to the victim even without established TCP connections. This attack approach is designed to suffocate the communication channels of the victim. The "ping of death" attack is simply flooding the victim with the ICMP echo packets, until it brings an unprepared host to its knee. A simple variation of the ping of death is to set the spoofed address to that of another victim. This way, receivers of both the ICMP echo and ICMP echo reply packets will suffer from high performance losses.
As mentioned earlier, the cooperative resource access model of the Internet architecture is the root of the DDoS problems. For example, World Wide Web (WWW), electronic mail, or other information services are provided to the general public with relatively little consideration on the users' behavior, and thus, they are most susceptible to DDoS attacks. Numerous operational solutions are published for the Internet community [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . Given its vastly large size, and enormous number of users involved, it will take time to strengthen and deploy new protocols for better defense of DDoS at the global level. We further note that it is possible to defend DDoS attacks using simple flow control techniques, with little or no modifications to the IP protocols. The center issue here is how to design an efficient congestion controller that can deal with ill posed traffic conditions. The DDoS problem also occurs to multiprocessor systems, where a large number of processors try to access a critical resource, such as a shared variable stored in a memory module, called a hot spot [24] . Control strategies designed for multiprocessor systems cannot be applied to DDoS defense on the Internet, because of the much larger transmission delays and complex traffic types on the Internet. DDoS management can be considered a special case of the flow control problem, which has been widely studied [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . The optimal control theory is proposed in [25] to manage the network traffic, on the basis of a nonlinear dynamic flow model. This technique needs to use explicit parameters of the network model, making it of limited practical values in real systems, because of its high sensitivity to parameter uncertainties. Binary feedback control [32] [33] [34] is widely used in network traffic control for its simplicity and efficiency. It relies upon a one-bit indicator in each probing packet to determine the congestion status of a network resource. The key design issue here is the threshold value(s) to set and unset the indicator bit. When combined with the sliding mode control approach [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] , they become a very effective and robust approach to optimize the threshold(s) of the binary feedback control scheme. The advantages of the sliding mode control scheme are its simplicity and robustness to parameter and model uncertainty.
In this paper, we develop a backward-propagation feedback control strategy for DDoS defense. When a host finds itself becoming a hot spot, it informs neighboring nodes and routers to reduce influx of attacking packets. By using the notion of relative degree [35] , [36] of nonlinear dynamic systems, we develop a simple on-off control strategy that does not require the use of a precise traffic model for such information like attack sources, and system configuration. A routing device just needs to be informed of the acceptable level of traffic rates from its (destination) neighbors, so that it can set the acceptable input rates to its (source) neighbors. One can see that this control scheme is not involved with any routing information, but is merely based on the mutually agreed throughput levels for coordinated defense of the DDoS attacks. Clearly, selection of the on and off thresholds is a key factor. The obvious selection of using one fixed-goal threshold variable for throttling is unrealistic because of the sizes and complex behavior of a large network. We derive the stable (oscillation free, asymptotically convergent) conditions to manage on-off throttling.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the network model being considered, and the basic characteristics of a generic routing device. We discuss the rate-based and queue-based control algorithms in Section III. A simple architecture to implement the flow control algorithms is presented in Section IV, and the paper concludes in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our scheme aims at a macroscopic solution approach. We assume that participating routing devices support flow control for their input and output ports. Two peered nodes execute flow regulating policies periodically. For its enormous sizes, and the significant differences of routing devices, it is impractical to take the entire Internet into a single model for our design. Instead, we propose a divide and conquer approach to partitioning the global network into smaller clusters, so that the DDoS defense can be implemented in a hierarchical manner. As a heuristic choice, and without loss of generality, we define a cluster as three connected nodes (see Fig. 1 ). It is not difficult to expand the model to twofour-or five-node-based clusters.
In this paper, we focus on the intracluster analysis, where the delays for data exchange and control actions within the clusters are negligible. The intercluster coordinated defense needs to use different design methodologies and solution algorithms, because of their much larger capacity, delays, and traffic volume. It is also necessary to better understand the relative degree properties of large networks, in order to prevent the coordinated defense algorithms from oscillation and other well-known stability issues.
Let us now consider the switch architecture in the cluster. Modern switching fabrics have high throughput with small blocking probabilities. Most of the packet delays in the routing devices are due to buffering and channel contention. Despite the obvious benefit of using dedicated resources for channels in the defense of DDoS, the shared memory-bus architecture is the most widely adopted design in practice, for its better flexibility and lower costs. As a result, we adopt the switch architecture shown in Fig. 1 , and the packet flow model proposed in [25] . We note that when an IP resource, e.g., a popular Internet web site, is under DDoS attack, its neighbors may or may not experience heavy traffic. A feedback control strategy based on the relative performance measure of a routing device, e.g., "the device is experiencing unusually high traffic," is not a reliable indicator for detection of DDoS attacks, because such observation could be caused by harmless surge of the service requests that should be warmly welcomed. On the other hand, once a DDoS attack is positively identified, such an indicator (traffic surge) can be an excellent cue to trace and curtail the DDoS attack. Once an attack is confirmed, the backward prorogation control rules should be engaged regardless of the current workload condition. Although not explicitly discussed here, one can use propagation paths of the feedback control signals to determine the routing, density, and frequency of the attacking packet streams.
For packet throttling, we use the sliding mode control theory to construct rate-based, and queue-based feedback control strategies. In practice, some routing devices that support layer-4 switching would be able to differentiate malicious packets but most others not. In our study, we use the same system models but different switch functions to analyze the two cases. One might speculate that given that the DDoS streams are identified, why not just drop their packets? We note that this approach implies that the routing devices must have full knowledge of the DDoS attacks, i.e., packet types, interactive sequences between the attacking machines and the victim, session states, etc., to avoid false dropping of regular packets. Furthermore, without packet dropping, one can more reliably push the throttling pressure back to the DDoS sources. An unexpected advantage of this nondropping scheme is that we can easily generalize the DDoS defense solutions for congestion prevention during normal operations.
The backward-propagation feedback control is very inexpensive to implement, making it much easier to be deployed into the field. One key issue for the backward-propagation feedback control strategy is its stability. It was observed in [24] that, even for the highly regular multiprocessor environment, a backward-propagation congestion control algorithm may oscillate or even break down at change of workload conditions. Due to the highly dynamic nature of the network traffic, we adopt the sliding control scheme that only makes use of the output measurements (traffic rate or buffer queue length) without considering the complete system states. This kind of controller is highly tolerant of uncertainty of system parameters. However, when the sliding controller is applied to a system with relative degree , one must use th-order derivatives of the outputs, to construct the sliding manifolds [38] , [39] . This is a must even for ideal switching (switching exactly takes place on the switch surface with zero control delay). The other condition [38] , [39] for system stability is that the corresponding zero dynamic [35] , [36] is stable, or equivalently, the system is minimum-phase [35] , [36] . The minimum-phase property can be guaranteed through proper selection of the outputs. The third factor that commonly leads to oscillation is the control delay, which when large enough prevents switching from taking place on the switch manifold(s), and produces chattering, which is a major potential issue that must be properly addressed. As mentioned earlier, we assume negligible delays for intracluster modeling, assuming that the time delay issue is negligible. Moreover, in Section IV, we adopt some smoothing techniques [40] [41] [42] [43] to reduce chattering effects.
A. Flow Dynamic Model [25]
The flow dynamic model is widely used for macroscopic modeling of network traffic. For its completeness, we adopted the notations and system conditions from [25] in this section. In this model, multiple input flows enter the switch from adjacent hosts or switches, and then, they are routed to the output queues, based on their header information. Packets can be dropped in the switch due to buffer overflow. Let us denote the collection of nodes by and the collection of unidirectional links by . The volume of total traffic entering is (1) where rate of packets arriving at from outside of the cluster; admitted portion of input traffic ; traffic demand generated by to ; admitted portion of the traffic from to . The first-order equilibrium equations for are defined in (2) - (5). (2) where the occupancy of the buffer associated with is denoted as the bandwidth of and the function is the outbound traffic
The traffic rejected at is (4) where the function specifies the rejected fraction of the outbound traffic . The traffic from to is
For a real system, must be positive, moreover, and are defined for . Therefore is also positive. In subsequent discussions, we assume that (this is reasonable, because outgoing traffic increases with buffer occupancy, and vice versa), and can be differentiated twice with respect to . Given that (6) where denotes the portion of the total traffic entering , which is routed to . So the following relations hold for (7) (8) The physical meaning of the above constraints is obvious and reasonable. For packet throttling, and are the natural choices of control variables. When and , respectively, it means that the entire input flow is accepted and rejected. A similar argument applies to . If and are all used as control variables, its means that the entire cluster is fully controlled. If we just use as control variables, it is the case of "edge control" which means we just throttle the traffic entering the network.
III. BACKWARD-PROPAGATION FEEDBACK CONTROL
In this section, we present the intracluster, rate-based, and queue-based backward propagation feedback control algorithms. We assume that the time difference between nodes in the same cluster is negligible, and the packet rate information of nodes in a cluster can be obtained and exchanged at reasonable costs, within acceptable accuracy. For the rate-based solution, the primary control and measurement parameter is the flow rate of a particular path or link. For the queue-based solution, we use queue length/occupancy of a buffer as the performance indicator. Using the criteria defined in the Appendices, we found that the relative degree [Appendix A] of the rate-based approach is one, so we need not use the derivative of the packet flow rate for the control algorithm. On the other hand, the relative degree of the queue-based scheme is two, implying that we do need to obtain the first derivative of the queue length measurement for the flow control algorithm. Intuitively, the first approach is more suitable for low traffic intensity situations, because of the lower levels of packet queuing. The second approach, on the other hand, is more suitable for high-intensity attacks, because packet queue lengths become very good indicators of the congestion/traffic level.
It is relatively simple for a DDoS victim to detect the presence of the attack. Many of its normal users cannot access the service, and/or the performance measure of the victim drops abruptly. It is much more difficult, sometimes impossible, to trace the exact routes of attacks, especially when the attacker is able to change the attack patterns. As mentioned earlier, our approach to the solution is a nondropping technique. Obviously, the effectiveness of the defense is proportional to the number of routing devices on the affected hot paths that participate in the defense. We note that a routing device may not have full knowledge of the hot and cold streams that pass through it. Under such a condition, it is not possible to have perfect control of the backward pressure propagation, but rather, we will need to rely on a search approach to identify the attacking paths and apply the greatest backward pressure to the strongest attack sources. One can achieve this objective by combining a classical depth-first or breadth first search algorithm, and a two way handshaking process between a routing device and the victim. Here, we focus on the traffic stability of the on-off control algorithm to avoid oscillation of traffic in both the victim and the related network resources.
The sliding mode, on-off control scheme is very simple and inexpensive. The feedback controller defines a switch function , which is a function of the outputs (rates, queue length, etc.,) and possibly their derivatives of the proper relative degree. At each control time instance, the system measures the new traffic value, possibly after removal of short-term bursts, and examines the required backward pressure between nodes. The value of changes with time, and the control objective is to force value toward the value of 0 at each time instance of the control action. By the on-off control rule, in an ideal system where only on and off are permissible actions, the throttling turns off when (all traffic permitted), and throttling turns on when (all traffic blocked). That is, on the state-space trajectory of , the control action has a step jump at and , and such a setting will lead to chattering problem. To avoid bursty traffic, the on-off control actions can be eased by continuous smoothing. That is, we change the control actions from a step jump to a slope function, so that throttling levels adjust with the values, to eliminate oscillation; see Section IV for more details. From now on, we assume that the bursty traffic is adequately smoothed to represent the true demand levels.
A. Rate-Based Control Algorithm
Consider the cluster topology in Fig. 2 , assuming that the hot spot and the hot packet streams have been identified. Two different types of hot packet sources are considered: hosts and network routing devices. Respectively, and are the hot and cold input rates from src1 to . and are defined in a similar manner. Now, let us consider the dynamic traffic flow model of the above topology, which is derived from the basic balance equation in (7) (9) Throttling applies only to the hot packet rates and . This implies that for (9), the coefficients of and are and , respectively, but the coefficients of and are one. We note that, it may be difficult to determine the explicit forms of and for real systems. Here, according to (1) and (5), and considering (the edge control case), the total input rate to the hot spot is (10)
After some simple reorganization, we can rewrite the above equations into the following forms:
where (12) and , and are defined similarly. The arguments of these functions will be omitted in later discussion, whenever it is convenient and without risk of confusion.
From the viewpoint of a control system, the defense of DDoS attacks is a strongly coupled, nonlinear system. In addition, the system parameters, e.g., and , may not be easily determined in an explicit form. As mentioned before, the control strategy must be robust to parameter and model uncertainties, or it may degrade the system performance, or even fluctuating throughput. Our goal is to keep the total input rate of the hot spot at a desired value through real-time adjustment of and according to current traffic conditions. Considering the fact that monotonically increases with and , we make a reasonable assumption that system (9) or (11) is minimum phase. Here, we can express the control objective by the following equations:
The control variables and appear in the first-order derivative of , so the relative degree is one. According to the sliding-mode control rules [Appendix C], one can select as the threshold function ( defines the sliding manifold). Intuitively, when , we adjust and to make . On the other hand, when , we select and to satisfy . Case 1: For or (15) where is defined in (14) . Given that and through some simple algebraic manipulation we set the constraints on control variables and (16) to satisfy and and thus . Case 2: For or , we need to have
Through a similar argument as in the case of , we can derive the control variables and such that (18) to satisfy and ; therefore, . A main concern of the control variable setting is the system stability. If and only if (15) and (17) are satisfied, holds. This means that , and by the Lyapvnov stability law, the system will converge to under the control strategy (15) and (17) . Given that (16) and (18) have stricter constraints than (15) and (17), control rules (16) and (18) guarantees that will asymptotically converge to zero, based on the Lyapvnov conditions. When combined with (8), the final control strategy can be written as [see (19) and (20) , it is possible that or . In this case, it implies that even if the hot traffic is not throttled ( or ), cannot be greater than zero, and thus, is always less than zero. Under such conditions, the total input rate to the hot spot cannot exceed the desired value , i.e., hot traffic and are not "hot" anymore.
As a final note, the relative degree of this three-node indeed is one because the switch function turns out to be not related to any high order derivatives of the controlled variables. If the relative degree turns out to be two, we should redefine the switch function as . For analysis of larger systems, such as the intercluster model, it will be necessary to consider the minimum phase conditions for (9) or equivalently (11).
B. Queue-Based Control Algorithm
Now, let us consider the cluster in Fig. 3 where is the destination of DDoS attacks, and the control objective is aimed at keeping the length of two queues in , and , at desired values and , respectively. can represent a subnetwork with links , and as the input and output links to the sub-network.
could also represent a collection of nodes including the hot spot and its adjacent nodes that need to be protected from the attack. We assume that the hot packet streams have been identified, where and are, respectively, the hot and cold input rates from src1 to , and and are defined in a similar manner.
The system equilibrium equations are (21) Based on the stated control objective, its control algorithms and system dynamics, we have concluded that this is a two-inputtwo-output control system, whose control variables are and , outputs and , and relative degrees (2, 2). As a result, we must use the first-order derivatives of the outputs and to construct the sliding manifolds. Similar to the rate-based control system, we assume that system (21) (27) for (19) and for (20) where (28) (29)
The control method is to adjust the values of so that (for ). To simplify the derivation, we define the following notation: when when (31) We need to derive and from on-line performance measures, which may or may not be readily available. To overcome this problem, we instead derive in (31) the range of and , so that they can be used in the following equation to set the bounds of control changes. That is, the control law becomes (32) Obviously, holds for . In fact when we have and when we have
These control laws guarantee that the system states converge to , based on the Lyupanov stability law. Because the sliding manifolds are stable (we select manually and ), will converge to , and to , under the above control law. Notice that it is necessary for the dynamic system (21) to be minimum phase to guarantee the system stability under the control law (32) .
Chattering increases with system delays, because switching will not take place exactly on the switch surface. Significant chattering will cause oscillation of the network traffic, making it a major hurdle to quality-guaranteed data networks. Continuous approximation [40] [41] [42] [43] is a technique widely used to reduce chattering, where one would replace abrupt control variable adjustment by slopes, or other similar functions. A main challenge here is to make sure that the state trajectory follows the switch manifold as close as possible, with minimal chattering effects. Assume that it is difficult to measure system parameters precisely, and based on the continuous approximation method suggested by [42] and [43] , we simplify the strategy (19) , (20) as shown in Fig. 4 . (33) and (34) where .
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION RESULTS
Our scheme can be readily implemented on most generic routing devices without changing their communication protocols, but we will focus on the ATM implementation here, because of its popularity in wide area networks. ATM supports priority transmission. During normal operations, an ATM switch (may) block inflow of new packets with lower priorities, when it decides that its buffer would be full "soon." For backward pressure (BP) propagation control, a single backward pressure bit is needed for each channel. One must have proper measures to guarantee that DDoS control packets can pass through clogged routing devices for execution of flow control decisions. This implies that the priority setting of internal control signals for channel arbitration will also need to be adjusted, in order to enforce preemption rules between channels. This feature is particularly important to counter DDoS attacks that are aimed at saturating the entire transport channels.
For rate enforcement, the leaky bucket algorithm can be readily applied. Here, CBR and VBR connections can be policed for peak cell rate using one and two buckets, respectively. Each of the connections can be guaranteed to be within 3% of granularity for bandwidth allocation, ranging from 64 k to 622 Mpls in commercial products. ATM uses the RM cell to carry information such as explicit cell rate, current cell rate, and queue length for flow control. A leaky bucket is mainly controlled by three parameters: 1) splash: the amount of fluid added to the bucket when a cell is taken into the network; 2) leak: the leak rate of the bucket; 3) Blimit: the maximum bucket size. A typical leaky bucket algorithm can be summarized as follows: DDoS defense can be modeled as a special case of the regular traffic policing problems in ATM transport. For normal operations, the traffic flow is examined for its conformance to the traffic contract, at arrival of each cell. The leaky bucket can be viewed as a virtual scheduler with continuous states, because it needs to be shared among different connections, and for its fine granularity in rate control. The leaky bucket needs to control the sustained constant rates (SCR) and the burst tolerance (BT). BT can be derived from SCR, peak constant rate (PCR), or other measures. When continuous smoothing is needed, one can easily use a counter to keep track of the increments that the leaky bucket must take to adjust the permissible flow rate at each control instance. Control actions for DDoS defense can be readily accommodated by usage parameter control (UPC), which is usually defined as the set of actions taken by the network to monitor traffic and enforce the traffic contract. The leaky bucket can either drop or tag offending cells of contract violators and DDoS offenders. An architectural diagram for the deal leaky bucket for DDoS defense is shown in Fig. 5 .
The total logic gate count to implement the leaky bucket, and the control block for update rate control parameter is estimated at less than 100 k, or roughly about 1 mm of the silicon area using the contemporary CMOS technology. Control parameter memory stores the rate control parameters such as leak, splash, and bucket limit for each flow. A total of 32 bits are needed for the rate control parameter entry to adjust the flow rate ranging from 2.5 b/s to 64 b/s. Each flow also has 32 sliding window that is controlled by the update rate control parameter block. If k bit SRAM is implemented as on chip memory, the silicon area is estimated at 10 mm in CMOS. This represents an insignificant amount of VLSI area for most router design.
We evaluated the proposed algorithms using time driven simulations. Three interconnected nodes in a cluster work together to defend the flood of packets caused by a DDoS attack that attacked node 3. The total hot packet rate exceeds 1, the average cold packet rate is equal to 0.2, and the control interval is set at ten clock cycles. The total buffer size is set at 60, and the target (average) queue length is set at 20, and the switch function is defined using the queue-based algorithm, based on the queue length and its first derivative. Referring to Fig. 6 , we compare the performance difference between nonsmoothing and smoothing control approaches at the left and right columns, respectively. Fig. 6(a) showed the queue buildup behavior in the three nodes. Before DDoS was engaged, we can see from Fig. 6(a) that the queues in the three nodes steadily grew until they became full. Then, when the DDoS defense kicked in, at clock time , the queue length at node 3 steadily declined until it reached the approximated target queue length. Both nodes 1 and 2 did not have buildup, because the inflow control has been backward propagated to their inputs, according to the control rules. In this case, the queue length is also averaged for every ten cycles for readability. The next issue of interest is the switching behavior. One can see from Fig. 6(b) that the values of the nonsmoothed switching clearly oscillated much more than the smoothed one, and the throttling actions were much more bursty than its smoothed counterpart. Finally, let us examine the performance of the cold packet streams in Fig. 6(c) . In both cases, the cold packet streams were affected, because of the powerful hot packet storms. The cold packet streams have similar throughput levels, but the smoothed control scheme produced less bursty fluctuation, for obvious reasons.
V. SUMMARY
This paper is our first attempt to give a comprehensive treatment of the complex system dynamics related to DDoS defense, based on two different performance metrics, and control algorithms. We believe that the algorithms can be implemented in VLSI with negligible overheads, and no significant protocol change is necessary. Despite our efforts in keeping the analysis rigorous and complete, the fundamental limits imposed by the underlying traffic flow models need to be further examined to ensure the applicability of the derived results. Primary factors related to oscillation include the time delay, (in)accurate representation of relative degree, noise (short bursts), and characteristics (relative degree, minimal phase, etc.) of the network under control. Many existing flow control protocols are essentially some variations of the on-off control strategies, using only the current output values to determine the next step of actions, making them susceptible to instability and breakdown. Non-minimal phase property is another important cause of oscillation. For stability/oscillation management, stable zero-dynamics and stable switching manifold is a must (see Appendix B). Whether or not other control approaches, such as nonminimal phase systems, are immune from this kind of stability issue is an interesting area of future research. 
APPENDIX C SLIDING MODE CONTROL
A sliding-mode controller forces the system under control to evolve on a predetermined switch manifold, which results in new system dynamics not present in the uncontrolled mode. When the system state deviates from the switching surface , control is applied to the system to force it to approach the switching surface (see Fig. 7 ). Control is discontinuous on the switching surface. For ideal sliding mode control, the system state trajectory will move toward the switching surface, and then keep evolving on the switching surface (i.e., the term sliding mode) to converge to the origin if is stable. The systems under the sliding-mode control approach are robust and insensitive to parameter uncertainties, making them highly tolerant of model uncertainties and disturbance. The main down side of this approach, however, is the chattering phenomenon, which is caused by the fact that this technique makes the state trajectory abruptly crosses the sliding manifold, even for the ideal, zero-delay cases. Switching cannot exactly take place on the switching surface for real systems, which leads the state trajectory to move back and forth over the surface . To construct a sliding mode controller, one must promise the existence and stability of the sliding mode. For a special case where the switching surface is constructed only with output and its derivatives, the dynamics of the sliding mode consists of two parts, the zero dynamics of the system and the switch function . Therefore, the sliding mode is stable if and only if the system's zero dynamics and the switch function are both stable. The stability of zero dynamics means the system is minimum-phase.
